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Abstract
The costs of implementing investment strategies represent a significant drag on the performance of mutual
funds and other institutional investors. It is the responsibility of institutional investors, and in the interests of
the individual investors they represent, to seek market mechanisms that mitigate trading costs. We investigate
an example of one such liquidity provision mechanism whereby liquidity demanders auction a set of trades as
a package directly to potential liquidity providers. A critical feature of the auction is that the identities of the
securities in the package are not revealed to the bidder. We demonstrate that this mechanism provides a
transactions cost savings relative to more traditional trading mechanisms for the liquidity demander as well as
an efficient way for liquidity suppliers to obtain order flow. We argue that the cost savings afforded this new
mechanism are due to the potential for low cost crosses with the bidder's existing inventory positions and
through the longer trading horizon, and superior trading ability, of the bidders. This research suggests that the
ability to innovate via new liquidity provision mechanisms can provide market participants with transaction
cost savings that cannot be easily duplicated on more traditional exchanges.
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Packaging Liquidity: 
Blind Auctions and Transaction Cost Efficiencies 
The costs of implementing investment strategies represent a significant drag on the performance 
of mutual funds and other institutional investors. It is the responsibility of institutional investors, 
and in the interests of the individual investors they represent, to seek market mechanisms that 
mitigate trading costs. We investigate one such liquidity provision mechanism whereby liquidity 
demanders auction a set of trades as a package directly to potential liquidity providers. A critical 
feature of the auction is that the identities of the securities in the package are not revealed to the 
bidder. We demonstrate that this mechanism provides a transactions cost savings relative to 
more traditional trading mechanisms for the liquidity demander as well as an efficient way for 
liquidity suppliers to obtain order flow. We argue that the cost savings afforded this new 
mechanism are due to the potential for low-cost crosses with the bidder's existing inventory 
positions and through the longer trading horizon, and superior trading ability, of the bidders. 
This research suggests that the ability to innovate via new liquidity provision mechanisms can 
provide market participants with transaction cost savings that cannot be easily duplicated on 
more traditional exchanges. 
1. Introduction 
The costs of implementing investment strategies represent a significant drag on the 
performance of mutual funds and other institutional investors. Given the abundant evidence that 
professionally managed portfolios underperform their benchmarks, the reduction of 
implementation costs should be a primary objective of investment managers. It is the 
responsibility of institutional investors, and in the interests ofthe individual investors they 
represent, to seek market mechanisms that mitigate trading costs. 
Financial markets have evolved with the implicit goal of minimizing search costs and 
maximizing the level of liquidity available, thereby increasing transactions efficiency for market 
participants. As markets have developed, market participants have revealed a desire to use 
trading venues that display a wide and varied set of execution characteristics. For example, 
consider how the 'upstairs market' has developed in order to allow market participants the ability 
to trade large blocks of stock in a single trade. Another attribute valued by market participants is 
the ability to trade a set of assets as a single unit, which has led to the development of the 'basket 
trading' market. More recently, electronic communication networks (ECNs), valued for their 
speed of execution, have provided market participants with the ability to pursue high frequency 
trading strategies. 
Despite the revealed preferences of market participants, many academics, regulators and 
practitioners question the benefits of having order flow fragmented among competing trading 
venues.
1 Market fragmentation opponents argue that consolidation of competing trading venues 
enhances liquidity provision and therefore improves 'best execution' for all market participants. 
With this fragmentation-consolidation debate as a backdrop, two important unanswered 
questions are: (1) Can alternative liquidity provision mechanisms be designed that provide 
transaction efficiencies relative to traditional liquidity provision mechanisms? and (2) How will 
the cost savings produced by this increased efficiency be generated and allocated among the 
parties to the transaction? 
1 See for example, Levitt ( 1999) and Pirrong (1999). 
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We analyze a relatively new trading mechanism, a "blind" auction of a package of 
transactions, to provide one example (of potentially many other trading mechanisms) where 
innovations in liquidity provision can benefit market participants with transaction efficiencies 
that are not easily duplicated on more traditional exchanges. In this blind auction a liquidity 
demander (asset manager) auctions a portfolio of trades directly to a set of liquidity providers 
(brokers). Two key features of this mechanism are first, that many trades are pooled together 
into a portfolio, or package, and second, that the bidders have only aggregated information 
concerning the individual trades in the package. That is, the identities of the individual securities 
in the package are not revealed to the bidders. 2 The liquidity demander has the option to accept 
the lowest bid or reject all bids . Available ev idence suggests that this mechanism is well 
established in the trading community and growing quickly. There are approximately 40 asset 
managers who regularly solicit bids on packages with 6 brokers actively bidding (see Chapman 
(2000)). 
We examine the transactions associated with 83 packages of equity trades with a 
combined value of $7.32 billion that were auctioned by an asset manager (the liquidity 
demander) over the period July 1998 to August 2000. Our results suggest that trading the 
packages via the blind auction mechanism resulted in trading costs that were 81 basis points 
lower than a benchmark estimate of trade costs that accounts for the difficulty of executing the 
indiv idual trades (e.g., the size ofthe indiv idual trades, the liquidity ofthe market for the stock, 
and the exchange on which the stock trades). This amounts to a 46 percent reduction in 
transaction costs relative to trading via traditional trading venues. At the same time, liquidity 
suppliers (bidders) are able to obtain order flow cheaply. The results suggest that the liquidity 
demander's cost savings from this liquidity provision mechanism hinge upon the liquidity 
providers (bidders) possessing both inventory positions with which they can cross many ofthe 
trades within the package and a longer trading horizon. To a lesser extent our results are also 
consistent with the cost savings being generated from liquidity providers ' (bidders) superior 
2 This is in contrast to basket, or program, trading where the exact composition of the portfolio (e.g., the S&P500) is 
known and the trades are all in one direction. 
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trading ability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model and 
describes the advantages of packaging and auctioning securities. Section 3 provides the details 
of a typical package auction and the supporting data used in the study. Section 4 compares the 
costs of trading a package with estimates ofthe benchmark cost of trading the securities 
indiv idually. In addition, we use trade and quote level data to examine hypotheses regarding the 
source of the lower cost of the package trades. Section 5 analyzes the strategies of the bidders as 
well as the strategy of the fund manager. Specifically, we highlight differences in how liquidity 
providers formulate their bids, as well as the decision of the fund manager to accept or reject the 
lowest bid. Section 6 concludes. 
2. A Model ofBiind (Principal Bid) Auctions 
2.1 Motivation: Asset Managers, the Demand for Liquidity, and Transactions Costs 
The inv estment performance of an asset manager is a function of both the underlying 
investment strategy and the costs of implementing that strategy. Because the transactions costs 
associated with implementation can represent a significant drag on performance, the asset 
manager has incentives to seek out the lowest-cost forms of liquidity prov ision. (See Keirn and 
Madhavan ( 1998) for an overview.) For example, the large portfolios managed by institutional 
investors frequently necessitate the trading of large blocks of individual stocks, and information 
or liquidity considerations may dictate that the transaction be completed quickly. A block trade 
in an individual stock requires a significant price concession (price impact) if sent en masse to 
the market maker for quick execution. Because of the inability of market makers to 
accommodate such large liquidity demands without significant price concessions, the upstairs 
market for large block transactions has evolved as a lower-cost mechanism for liquidity 
provision for the extreme liquidity demands of institutional investors (see Burdett and O' Hara 
(1987), Grossman (1992), and Keirn and Madhavan (1996)). Nevertheless, the cost of executing 
block trades in the upstairs market can also be expensive, especially for illiquid stocks. For 
example, Keirn and Madhavan (1996) report an average price impact of 4.34% for seller-initiated 
blocks of illiquid NYSE and Nasdaq stocks. 
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In the event that the asset manager does not demand such extreme immediacy, a large 
order (block trade) can be fragmented into smaller individual trades that are executed over a 
longer period of time. While smaller indiv idual trades likely reduce the aggregate price impact 
of an order relativ e to a block trade, the price concessions institutions face are, nevertheless, a 
large fraction of their overall trading costs. Moreover, active managers may not have the luxury 
of patience when the private information motivating the trade has a short half-life. Index 
managers also may demand greater immediacy if their portfolios are constructed to closely track 
an underlying index. In these cases the block still may be broken up, but must be traded over a 
short interval. For such managers, the cost of trading the fragmented block may still be 
expensive enough to offset any value-added from the investment strategy. For example, Keirn 
and Madhavan (1997) show that round-trip trade costs for large orders (made up of smaller 
individual transactions) by institutional inv estors in small-cap stocks averaged 5.7 percent in the 
early 1990s . 
2.2 The Manager's Problem 
Consider an asset manager whose investment decision process generates a list of 
securities transactions. Such a list might result from the periodic execution of a proprietary 
quantitative model that determines the investable universe for the portfolio, or from periodic 
meetings of an investment committee. The list of transactions might also result from a liquidity 
shock, such as a cash inflow or redemption. Note that the composition oftrades on the list can 
consist of buys, sells, or a mixture of buys and sells. One option available to the manager is to 
execute the list of transactions indiv idually on the in-house trade desk (this may include utilizing 
any of a number of traditional mechanisms such as agency trading, the upstairs market, etc.). 
However, this is potentially expensiv e if the objective is to trade the securities quickly because, 
as discussed earlier, transaction costs for liquidity demanders increase with the degree of 
immediacy desired. 
Alternatively, the manager can sell the list to a broker for execution. When the broker 
agrees to assume ownership of the package and execute the trades, execution risk is transferred 
from the asset manager to the broker. In the arrangement between the broker and asset manager 
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examined here, this transfer is achieved by the broker assuming ownership of the bundle of stock 
positions and guaranteeing to the manager the closing price at day t-1 for each individual stock 
in the package. Thus, the manager is guaranteed "execution" of the package at yesterday's 
closing prices, and the execution risk associated with liquidating the package of trades now 
resides with the broker. 
In placing a package up for bid, the manager's optimization problem is to minimize 
transaction costs by choosing between the low bid presented him in the auction and the expected 
transaction costs resulting from execution by the manager using his standard trading 
mechanisms. Thus, from the manager's perspective, the benefit of packaging trades is the 
elimination of execution (price) risk and the potential for lower costs of trading. 
2.3 The Brokers' Problem 
Consider a set of brokers who each have a stochastic book of pending transactions, where 
each broker only knows the composition of his own book. The books are stochastic with respect 
to the stocks that are represented, the amounts to be traded, and the direction of the trades. Each 
broker is presented with the opportunity to bid on a package of trades that would deliver a large 
amount of orderflow to the broker and provide the potential for many pending trades to be 
completed. Brokers submit a bid or commission fee they are willing to receive for assuming the 
execution risk of the package and providing liquidity. Each bid, which is a function ofthe 
individual broker' s expected costs oftrading the package components, is presumably high 
enough to cover his own costs of liquidating the package (plus some profit) but lower than the 
manager's expected cost of executing the individual trades in-house. Thus, from the broker' s 
perspective, the benefit of bidding on a package arises from the ability to inexpensively acquire 
bulk order flow. 3 The broker's optimization problem is to maximize profits, which are a 
function of the brokers' cost of trading, by choosing a bid that is low enough to win the auction 
but high enough to generate profits from the trades. 
Why might the broker's expected costs of trading a package be lower than the manager' s 
3 An additional advantage of a successful bid on a package of trades is that the broker can induce a large quantity of 
order flow by adjusting a single commission fee, which is preferable to adjusting the separate commissions for 
individually brokered transactions on many stocks. 
expected costs? 
Hypothesis 1: The broker may have a large book of pending transactions (or may soon 
have from successful bids on other packages), and these transactions may represent the other 
side of many ofthe manager's trades already in place, resulting in the potential for low-cost 
crosses. 
Hypothesis 2: The broker may not be constrained by the immediacy facing the manager 
and, as a result, has a trading horizon that is longer than the asset manager's, permitting patient, 
lower-cost trading. 
Hypothesis 3: The broker possibly has greater trading expertise than the manager as a 
result of the benefits from economies of scale afforded by a larger trading operation. 
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The last two hypotheses are broker-specific and are not related to the characteristics of 
the package and its components. The first hypothesis is jointly related to both the composition 
of the broker's book and the composition of the package. It is this aspect of the package that can 
sufficiently lower the broker's cost so that he can submit a low enough bid (below the manager 's 
expected cost) to be successful, yet be high enough (above his own expected costs) to be 
profitable. Obviously, the larger the percentage ofthe package that can be crossed with existing 
positions on the broker's book, the lower the cost to the broker of executing the trades, and the 
higher his overall profit. 
2.4 Conditions for an Equilibrium 
First, and perhaps obviously, the use of a competitive auction will ensure a competitive 
and fair price for the transaction services being demanded. Second, a double blind auction is 
used because of information asymmetries arising from proprietary information that neither party 
to the transaction wants to reveal to the other. The auction is double blind in the following sense: 
(1) the broker does not know the identities of the individual securities in the package, and is 
provided only with limited information (sector and market cap distributions, percentage of 
Nasdaq stocks, etc.) concerning the degree of intersection between the package and his book; 
and (2) the manager does not know the composition ofthe broker's book and the potential for 
crosses with trades contained in the package and, therefore, has limited information about the 
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broker's cost of executing the trades in the package. From the manager's perspective, the 
package of trades is the output ofthe manager's proprietary model; minimizing the 
dissemination of that information is important and valuable to the manager. If the auction were 
not blind, each bidder, irrespective of their bid, would know the forthcoming trades of either the 
manager or the winning bidder and would be able to front-run those trades. Thus, the losing 
bidders could extract trading profits at the expense of the higher trading costs for the manager or 
the winning bidder. The same arguments can be applied to the revelation of the bidder's existing 
book of trades. The double blind feature ensures the confidentiality of information from both 
sides of the transaction. 
Also relevant here is the ' no trade' principle of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) that too 
much information may cause markets to break down. On one hand, if the bidders knew the 
components of the package, they could extract the entire cost of the manager trading the 
securities on his own, effectively shutting down the mechanism. On the other hand, if the 
manager knew the trading costs of bidders, she could extract the entire surplus from their bids, 
again shutting down the market. Rothschild and Stiglitz ( 1977) provide another example of this 
problem in the context of the insurance market. 
3. The Blind Auction Mechanism and Supporting Data 
3.1 A Description of the Auction Process 
In the blind auction mechanism, the manager puts the package of transactions up for bid 
in a sealed bid auction. The "price" submitted by the bidders participating in the auction is the 
commission fee, stated in average cents per share, they will charge to assume ownership of the 
package. Thus, the lowest submitted commission fee wins the auction. Note that the bidders are 
not aware of the identities ofthe other bidders. 
Importantly, the asset manager, the seller of the package in the auction, reveals neither 
the identity of the securities in the package nor the individual quantities to be transferred. This is 
a key attribute of the auction- because the asset manager' s quantitative models are proprietary, 
the bidders do not know the composition of the portfolio and resulting trades . This aspect ofthe 
package trades examined here distinguishes them from program trades of index managers in 
which the composition of the program is known and directly related to the underlying index 
composition. The uncertainty for the bidders in the blind auction is a function of the degree of 
difficulty of the trades contained in the package, which of course is unknown. 
To give some feel for the heterogeneity of the trades within a package, Panel A of Table 
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1 provides sample information for the individual trades in a package that was auctioned on 
October 29, 1999. The package shown is smaller, in terms of number of names and total value, 
than the typical package in our sample, but was chosen to illustrate the potential for uncertainty 
regarding the degree of trade difficulty associated with the transactions contained in these 
packages. First, most of the stocks are small and illiquid, with many residing in the smallest half 
of market capitalization for NYSE stocks. Second, the quantity of shares to be traded is large, in 
most cases representing a significant fraction of typical daily dollar trading volume, and in two 
extreme cases, representing 43 and 126 percent of each stock's average daily dollar trading 
volume (see the VolRatio v ariable). As mentioned previously, this information on the package 
composition is not revealed to the brokers bidding on the package. 
Nevertheless, some of the uncertainty regarding the trade difficulty of the package is 
resolved prior to the bidding because information regarding the characteristics of the package is 
provided to potential bidders on the morning of the auction. The characteristics include: 
( 1) the number of stocks in the package; 
(2) the total number of shares to be traded; 
(3) the total package value (number of shares multiplied by yesterday's closing price); 
(4) percentage ofbuys; 
(5) percentage ofNasdaq stocks; 
(6) the average correlation of the component securities with the S&P500; 
(7) the distribution of market capitalization for the component securities; 
(8) the distribution of VolRatio =[(Number of Shares Traded* Price) I (Average Daily Dollar 
Trade Volume over the previous 12 months)]* 100; 
(9) the distribution of quoted spreads within the package; and 
(10) the allocation of the component securities across economic sectors. 
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Panel B of Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the characteristics of the October 
29, 1999 package. The information shown in Panel B is not as detailed as the distributional 
summary statistics given to the bidders. For example, we do not report on the industry 
membership and bid-ask spread quotes for the stocks in the package, information that is provided 
to the bidders. Nevertheless, Panel B does give some appreciation for the incomplete picture the 
brokers have when formulating their bids. What the potential bidders might infer from this 
somewhat fuzzy snapshot is that the package is not particularly large ($24. 73 million in total 
value), is equally distributed across buys and sells, contains a substantial percentage of small-cap 
stocks, most of them being non-Nasdaq stocks, many of which trade in relatively illiquid 
markets. What this incomplete picture doesn't tell the bidders is that there are a number of 
extremely difficult trades that represent significant fractions of typical daily dollar trading 
volume. Nor does the information given the bidders provide any clues about potential trouble 
stocks that may be distressed or otherwise going through difficult times. Note that although the 
picture is incomplete, all the bidders are prov ided with this same fuzzy image.4 
The information regarding the above characteristics is submitted to the potential bidders 
by 8 AM ET on the morning ofthe auction. Each participating bidder returns a (sealed) bid by 9 
AM ET that same day. The bid represents a cents-per-share commission fee that the broker will 
charge the asset manager to guarantee execution at yesterday's closing prices for the trades in the 
package. 5 The asset manager collects all bids and makes a decision by 9:15 AM ET (before the 
market opens) to either accept the lowest bid or reject all bids (and execute the trades using his 
standard trading technique). Each bidder is notified and informed whether their bid was accepted 
or rejected. In the case of rejection of all bids, the asset manager shares no information on the 
submitted bids, the outcome of the auction (i.e., was a bid accepted?), the identities ofthe 
4 While there is an incentive on the part of the manager to package some extremely difficult tmdes, two items 
mitigate this. First, most package trading armngements contain a force majeure clause which automatically 
eliminates individual trades from the package that experienced a 5% price move from the previous day close to the 
open on the morning of the auction. Second, the manager's reputation as a trustworthy counterparty would be 
jeopardized, and the set of subsequent bidders reduced, by attempting to hide difficult tmdes in the package. 
5 Other package tmding mechanisms guarantee different pricing functions for the component stocks. For example, 
some auctions, that we have been made aware of, guarantee the weighted average transaction price throughout the 
auction day instead of yesterday's closing price, thereby reducing the price risk to the broker and lowering the fee 
charged the manager. 
10 
bidders, or the identity of the desired transactions with the bidders. In the case of a winning bid, 
the list of desired transactions (specifying the identity of the stocks, the direction of the trades 
(buy or sell), and number of shares) is transferred immediately to the winning broker. However, 
neither the outcome of the auction nor the list of desired transactions is revealed to the losing 
bidders. 
If a bid is accepted, the asset manager wires the net proceeds (purchases minus sales) 
plus the commission (i.e., the amount of the winning bid) to the winning bidder. In addition, the 
winning bidder takes possession of shares (in the case of a sale) and transfers shares to the asset 
manager (in the case of a purchase). Two logistical issues are worth noting. First, the executed 
package is typically reported in London or Tokyo, thereby camouflaging the transaction. 
Second, individual trades within the package are cleared using the standard T + 3 procedure. Thus 
the winning bidder has 3 days to deliver the necessary shares to accommodate the manager's 
purchases. 
3.2 The Package Data 
Our data contain the auction details and the contents of 83 packages of equity trades with 
a combined value of $7.32 billion that were auctioned over the period July 1998 through August 
2000. We have the following details for every stock included in each package: the ticker symbol; 
a buy-sell indication; the number of shares to be traded; the exchange on which the stock trades; 
the average daily dollar trading volume over the previous 12 months; the closing price on the day 
before the auction; and market capitalization. Regarding auction information, we have the 
identities and bids of all the bidders for each auctioned package, as well as the decision by the 
asset manager to either accept the lowest bid or pass on all bids. 
Table 2 provides summary characteristics separately for the completed and passed 
packages. Out of 83 packages, a winning bid was accepted for 48 packages with a combined 
value of $4.27 billion ("completed" packages), while 35 packages with a combined value of 
$3.05 billion had no bid accepted ("passed" packages). The packages range from 30 to 396 
stocks of which 5 to 50% are Nasdaq stocks. The percentage of buy orders is in general near 
50%, although the percentage ranges from 15 to 100%. In comparing the completed versus 
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passed packages, the samples are similar in terms of the total value of the package, the 
percentage of component stocks that are Nasdaq, and the market capitalization of the component 
stocks. Howev er, the completed packages tend to contain more stocks on average (163) than do 
the passed packages (98), while the passed packages contain a much larger trade volume per 
stock in the package (35,743 shares) than do the completed packages (20,651 shares). 
The summary statistics in Table 2 also indicate that the packages are populated with very 
large and difficult trades, as revealed through VolRatio the ratio of dollar volume traded to the 
av erage daily dollar trading volume measured over the prior twelve months. Further, the passed 
packages contain, on av erage, more difficult trades than the completed packages . The average 
trade size of the stocks in the completed packages represents 10.81 percent of the average daily 
dollar volume, while the corresponding number for the passed packages is 15.21 percent. The 
large difference in trade difficulty between the completed and passed packages suggests that the 
manager's decision to pass on packages is perhaps related to relatively higher bids associated 
with the presence of more difficult trades in those packages. Indeed, for one of the passed 
packages the average dollar trade size of the component trades represented 45.3 percent of their 
respective average daily dollar volume. And for eight of the 35 passed packages, the average 
dollar trade size exceeded 50 percent of av erage daily dollar v olume for more than 10 percent of 
the stocks in the package. 
4. Evidence on Packaging as a Low-Cost Trading Mechanism 
4.1 A Benchmark Trade Cost: Estimated Costs ofTrading the Package Components Individually 
While we hav e the manager' s realized trading costs for the passed packages, the 
manager's costs of executing the individual trades within the package are not observed for the 
successfully auctioned packages since the trades are not executed by the manager. In order to 
both proxy for the absent realized costs for the traded packages as well as to dev elop a general 
pricing model for package trades, we construct a benchmark for the costs of executing the 
indiv idual trades contained in the packages. To construct the benchmark, we first estimate a 
model of trade costs as developed in Keirn and Madhavan (1997). Their model shows that 
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equity trade costs for institutional money managers are a function of trade venue (NYSE, 
Nasdaq, etc.), trade size, market capitalization and the inverse of price (a proxy for the 
proportional bid-ask spread). We use updated parameter estimates of their model for the period 
April 1996 to March 1997 (just prior to the sample period for our packages). The estimated 
parameters of the model, obtained from Keirn (2002) for a sample ofU.S. equity trades for 33 
institutional money managers follow6 (T -statistics are in parentheses): 
Buys 
Cost,= -0. 231 8 + 0.4803 D ,OTc + 0.9563 TradeSize, + 25.032 (JIPJ - 0.0973 ln(Mcap,) Adj.R2=0.05 
(-3.48) (7.66) (21.73) (22.45) (-4.75) (N=35,468) 
Sells 
Cost1= 0.5803 + 0.5845 D,OTc + 1.7100 TradeSize1 + 5.3080 (l!PJ- 0. 1713 ln(Mcap,) Adj.R2=0.05 
(9.58) (8.50) (30.21) (6.38) (-8.32) (N=32,471) 
where Cost is the total cost of the trade (including both price impact and commissions), D are 
equals one for a Nasdaq stock and zero otherwise, TradeSize is the number of shares traded as a 
percent of the total shares outstanding, P is the stock price, and M cap is the market capitalization 
of the stock in $billions. As in Keirn and Madhavan (1997), trade costs for this updated sample 
of institutional trades are significantly related to the independent variables for both buys and 
sells: costs are higher for Nasdaq stocks than for exchange-traded stocks; are positively related 
to trade size and the bid-ask spread; and are inversely related to market capitalization. 
6 Note that the Nasdaq Order Handling Rules were phased in from January 20, 1997 through October 1997. In 
addition, the tick size reduction from l/8th to 1116th occurred on June 2, 1997 for Nasdaq and June 24, 1997 for the 
NYSE. Consequently, our benchmark is estimated before the Rule changes while our sample of package trades 
occurs after these events. A recent paper by Jones and Lipson (2001) suggests that institutional trade costs may have 
been adversely affected by these regulatory changes. Thus, benchmark costs estimated before the rule changes 
might be conservative (low) when applied to the period after the rule changes, other things equal. To check for this 
possibility, we also estimated the model using institutional trade data for the calendar year 2000, after the new Rules 
were implemented and concurrent with a portion of our sample period. Estimates of predicted trade costs using the 
parameter estimates for the 2000 period are qualitatively the same as the results reported in the paper based on the 
1996-97 parameter estimates. We chose not to use the 2000 model estimates because many of the packages in our 
sample occurred before that time period. 
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We use these parameter estimates in conjunction with the corresponding characteristics 
for the individual components of the packages to compute predicted values of the costs 
associated with execution ofthe individual trades having those characteristics by a representative 
institution. For example, the predicted cost of buying 50,000 shares of a Nasdaq stock with a 
market cap of $1 billion and a price of $25 is 1. 58%. Think of these predicted values as the costs 
incurred by the asset manager (liquidity demander) had she actually executed the trades 
individually. 
Once the predicted costs for the individual trades are computed as described above, we 
then aggregate by computing the volume-weighted trade cost for each package. This volume-
weighted trade cost is a benchmark for the cost of trading this package of securities, in the 
specified quantities, by a typical institutional investor. For example, the estimate for the 
benchmark cost of the package trade of October 29, 1999 (described in Table 1) is 1.33%. 
Across all 83 packages in our sample, the average estimated benchmark cost of trading the 
package components individually is 1.867% (averaged over the individual components within a 
package, then across packages) with a standard deviation of0.949%. The median estimated 
benchmark cost across packages is 1.806%, with a minimum (maximum) of 0.221% (5.137%). 
What remains to be seen is how these estimated benchmark costs of trading the stocks 
individually compare with both the costs to the liquidity demander associated with auctioning 
the securities in package form and the trade costs realized by the manager when the auction bids 
were rejected. 
4.2 The Determinants of Brokers' Bids 
While it is possible to estimate the trade costs of individual trades of the liquidity 
demander, it is not possible to assess the costs incurred by the brokers when trading the package 
securities because we do not have information on the percentage of trades within the package 
that can be crossed with existing positions in the broker's book. At one extreme, all the trades in 
the package could be crossed, and the broker's cost of providing liquidity would be zero. In this 
case the broker's profit from assuming the responsibility of executing the package equals the 
commission charged. At the other extreme, all the trades in the package would have to be 
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executed immediately in the market and, therefore, have costs equivalent to the asset manager's 
expected costs. In this case, the broker suffers an expected loss equal to the asset manager's 
expected costs minus the broker's commission. Because some positive percentage of the trades 
will likely be crossed with existing positions in the broker's book, the broker's expected profits 
(and costs) will lie between these two extremes. 
What determines the costs for the trades that the broker actually executes? The broker 
faces the same trade-specific costs that hav e been defined in previous research. These costs are 
related to the size of the trade (i.e., the volume of shares traded), the liquidity of the venue in 
which the stock trades (Nasdaq vs. NYSE), and the bid-ask spread. However, in the context of a 
package of trades and because of the sequence of ev ents in the blind auction process, there are 
additional factors that are important. First, there is a diversification effect related to the number 
of stocks in the package. The greater the number of stocks in a package, the greater the 
possibility that subsequent adv erse price movements will offset each other (Axelson ( 1999) 
examines this effect in the context of bundling securities for sale; see also Gorton and Pennacchi 
(1993)), thereby lowering the total cost of executing the indiv idual trades in the package. 
Second, the relative numbers of buy and sell transactions in the package will affect the 
probability of crosses with the broker's existing inventory of positions. Other things equal, a 
broker with a surplus of existing buy (sell) transactions would submit a lower (i.e., more 
aggressive) bid for a package that contained predominantly sell (buy) transactions. For packages 
that contain similar numbers of buys and sells, this effect will be negligible. Finally, because the 
broker is guaranteeing yesterday's closing price in an auction that takes place the following 
morning, the overnight behavior of markets will affect the prices at which the broker will be able 
to liquidate the positions in the package. Further, the magnitude of this affect will be a function 
of the composition of buys and sells within the package. For example, a package that contains 
predominantly buys will elicit a higher (less aggressive) bid if the overnight market return is 
positive, other things equal, because the expected higher opening prices for stocks will result in 
higher expected execution values. The opposite will occur for a package of predominantly sells. 
For packages that contain similar numbers of buys and sells, this effect will be negligible. 
To provide some confmnation ofthe determinants of the broker's expected costs of 
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executing the trades contained in the packages, we estimate a model that includes the factors 
discussed above. We include the following factors to capture the main costs and benefits of 
assuming ownership of the package: the number of stocks in the package; the total number of 
shares to be traded; the skewness of VolRatio (defined as the ratio of the dollar value of the trade 
to the average daily dollar trading volume over the prior twelve months); the percentage of 
stocks in the package that trade on Nasdaq; and the average ofthe inverse of the stock price (a 
proxy for the proportional bid-ask spread). To capture the buy/sell concentration effect as well 
as the behavior of the ov ernight market, we use the following two v ariables- the number of buys 
as a percentage of the total number oftrades in the package, and the overnight return on the S&P 
500 futures from Globex. Note that in our sample the number of buys expressed as a percentage 
of the total number of trades in the package is tightly distributed around 50% (half of our sample 
of packages have a value for the percentage buys that lies between 42% and 53%, and 90 percent 
ofthe packages lie between 35% and 65%). Because ofthe lack of packages that are 
predominantly buys or sells, we expect that neither the buy/sell concentration effect nor the 
overnight market effect described in the previous paragraph will be easily detected in our 
sample. Indeed, neither of these variables, nor an interaction term, was significant when 
included in the model, so we do not include them in the specification show below. The 
regression estimated for all 83 packages in our sample yields the following results 7 (T -statistics 
are in parentheses) 
Bidi = -0 .307 - 0.001NumStocksi + 0.008NumShri + 0.017TrSkewi + 0.015Nasdaqi + 0.172(1/PJ 
(2.69) (5.01) (7.02) (1.09) (5.31 ) (5.63) 
N = 83; Adj. R2 = 0.721 
where: Bidi is the low bid for package i stated as a percent of the value of the package and 
reported in percentage terms; N umStocksi is the number of stocks in package i; NumShri is the 
mean number of shares traded for stocks in package i, in thousands of shares; TrSkewi is the 
estimated skewness of the distribution of Vo!Ratio for stocks in the package i; Nasdaqi is the 
7 The regression was also estimated using the average bid as the dependent variable, which yielded quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar results. 
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percentage of stocks in package ithat trade on Nasdaq (in%); and J/Pi is the mean ofthe ratio of 
1.0 I price for the stocks in package i. 
The regression results provide a clear characterization of the bidder's concerns regarding 
execution costs when submitting a bid. First, bids are lower (more aggressiv e), the larger the 
number of stocks that are being traded. This is consistent with the idea that the larger the 
number of stocks in a package, the greater the diversification effect in execution risk. Also, a 
larger number of stocks present a higher likelihood that the individual trades can be crossed 
internally within the bidders' current portfolio. In contrast, bids are higher (less aggressive) as 
the total share volume within a package increases, reflecting larger and, therefore, more difficult 
trades for a given number of stocks within a package. Also, bids are increasing in the degree of 
skewness in the distribution of trade size. These results are symptomatic of the bidder's concern 
that a small number of individual trades in the package might be extremely difficult to execute, 
perhaps representing substantial fractions of typical daily trading volume. For such packages, the 
cost of these few extremely difficult trades may represent a significant portion of the overall cost 
of trading the entire package. Lastly, bidders submit higher (less aggressive) bids, the higher the 
proportion ofNasdaq stocks and the lower the av erage price level. Huang and Stoll (19%), 
Keirn and Madhavan (1997) and others show that institutional trade costs are higher for Nasdaq 
stocks than for NYSE stocks. Similarly, Harris ( 1994) points out that given a common fixed 
minimum tick size, the bid-ask spread represents a larger percentage of the stock price the lower 
a stock's price lev el. Therefore, all else equal, low priced stocks tend to be more costly to 
transact. While the R-squared of the regression is high, the unexplained portion (representing 
26% of the variation in bids) is not trivial and is likely attributable to the proportion of trades in 
the package that can be crossed in the broker's book. We will turn to this in Section 5. 
4.3 A Comparison of Package (Bid) Costs and Benchmark Trade Costs 
Table 3 and Figure1 compare the low (winning) bid, stated as a percent of total package 
value, the benchmark cost, estimated according to the model discussed in section 4.1, and the 
asset manager's realized trading costs for the passed packages. To highlight the differences in 
the costs for the completed and the passed samples, the left side of Figure 1 presents results for 
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the completed packages while the right side presents the passed packages. Within each panel, 
the package costs are listed in chronological order. There are several important observations. 
First, all three series are highly correlated. Fluctuations in the low bids across packages have 
correlations with the estimated benchmark trade costs and the realized trade costs of0.82 and 
0.63, respectiv ely . In addition, for the passed packages, the estimated benchmark trade costs 
have a correlation with the manager's realized trade costs of0.63. Second, trade costs - both 
estimated benchmark costs and package low bids - are higher for the passed packages than for 
the completed packages. The average low bid on the passed packages (1.11 %) is significantly 
higher than the av erage winning bid on the completed packages (0.67%) with a t-value of 8.14. 
Similarly, the average estimate of individual trade cost for the passed packages (2.40%) is 
significantly higher than for the completed packages (1.48%) with at-v alue of 4.98. These 
findings confirm the inferences drawn in section 3.2 from the package characteristics in Table 2: 
to wit, the stocks in the passed packages are more difficult to trade than the completed packages, 
resulting in higher bids that have, on average, a greater likelihood of being rejected. Third, the 
bids are lower than both the estimated benchmark trade costs and the manager's realized trade 
costs for almost every package. Over the entire sample, the average benchmark trade cost is 
1.87% in contrast to 0.86% for the average low bid, and the difference is significant (t= 13.00). 
This difference is larger for the passed packages ( 1.30%, t= 11.43) than for the traded packages 
(0.81%, t=8.32). For the passed packages, the average benchmark trade cost and realized trade 
costs are 2.40% and 1.49% respectively. Both figures are statistically significantly higher than 
the average low bid of 1.106%.8 An important implication of these last fmdings is that for the 
packages for which a winning bid is accepted, the manager saves, on average, an economically 
significant 81 basis points by auctioning the package, measured relative to the estimated 
benchmark cost. By the same token, for the 38 packages in the passed sample, the manager 
suffered 130 basis points of foregone savings if measured against the benchmark and 40 basis 
points of foregone savings if measured against his own realized trade costs. 
8 There are some caveats to the realized trading cost figures. On one hand, the manager did not always complete the 
full number of shares for each component. The manager failed to complete the total number of shares for 17 of the 
35 passed packages while 7 packages had less than 95% of the original shares executed. On the other hand, the 
manager sometimes executed more than the volume specified in the package. The first effect biases the costs 
downward, while the second effect likely biases the costs upward. 
18 
As an alternate benchmark for the individual trade costs we also computed the costs 
assuming the bidder traded all package components at the opening trade on the day of the 
auction. This is an admittedly unrealistic assumption because it assumes the bidder can execute 
large trades at the opening price and without any price concession. We know that many of these 
trades represent substantial fractions of average daily v olume and require large price concessions 
in order to satisfy such demands for immediacy. Nonetheless, it does provide a 'lower bound' to 
the costs oftrading the package individually. Panel2 of Figure 1 overlays the alternate 
benchmark. The mean ofthe alternate benchmark is 0.05%. Notice that the bid lies between the 
Keirn-Madhavan benchmark and the lower bound estimate (alternate). The alternate benchmark 
as well as the manager's own realized trade costs provide support for the reasonableness and 
accuracy of the Keirn-Madhav an benchmark, which incorporates price concession costs, as well 
as our claim that package trading provides cost savings to both the manager and the bidders. 
4. 4 Basis for Cost Savings 
Given the significant overall cost savings of auctioning a package of securities 
transactions relative to trading the individual securities internally, we examine three hypotheses 
concerning this efficiency gain. Using individual security trade and quote-lev el data from the 
NYSE T AQ database, we argue that the cost savings are due primarily to three adv antages that 
the bidders (liquidity providers) have over the asset manager. First and most importantly, 
hypothesis 1 states that bidders hold potentially extensive inventories of offsetting transactions 
that can be used to cross a large portion of the indiv idual package trades. Again, crossing trades 
presents zero costs to the bidders and is likely to represent the majority of the cost differential 
between the manager and bidders. Hypothesis 2 states that the bidders have less demand for 
immediacy than the manager when disposing of the acquired position, resulting in a longer 
trading horizon. We do not have evidence on how much longer their trading horizon might be, 
however, anecdotal evidence suggests that liquidity providers may take several days, and 
possibly weeks, to complete a large trade, whereas the manager's horizon is typically two or 
three days at most. Hypothesis 3 argues that on average the bidders are likely to be better traders 
than the traders on the manager's internal trading desk. These efficiencies in trading are likely to 
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come from economies of scale associated with a large trading operation and/or the proximity and 
linkages to exchanges, (potentially owning seats on particular exchanges or being designated 
market makers). 
To investigate these three hypotheses, we extract the trade and quote data from the T AQ 
database for each of the stocks within each package. For each individual stock symbol we 
collect all trades and quotes for the 9-day period beginning three days before the auction date 
and ending five days after the auction date. In preparing the trade and quote data to be used in 
calculating the variables of interest, we conduct the standard adjustments. First, the National 
Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) is calculated over the nine-day window for each stock. The NBBO 
represents the lowest ask price and highest bid price quoted by any trading venue making a 
market in the stock. Second, trades are adjusted using the Lee and Ready (1991) five second 
rule and are designated as buyer or seller-initiated using the Lee and Ready classification 
scheme. In particular, trades are designated as buyer- (seller-) initiated if the trade price is above 
(below) the current NBBO midpoint. For trades at the NBBO midpoint, the initiator is 
determined by whether the last transaction price change was an uptick (buy) or downtick (sell). 
Using the trade and quote data, we construct three variables that are relevant for our three 
hypotheses: cumulative market-adjusted returns, net dollar trading volume in the direction of the 
package trade, and a trading efficiency measure, respectively. We discuss the construction of 
each in turn. 
To construct cumulative market-adjusted returns, we compute daily returns for each stock 
using end-of-day quote midpoints, then the return of the Russell 2000 value index over the 
corresponding day is subtracted to obtain a measure of market-adjusted movement for each 
stock. We use the Russell 2000 Value Index to match the small cap-value characteristics of the 
stocks in our sample (which are dictated by the investment style of the asset manager). Having 
normalized the market-adjusted return of each stock to one the day before the auction, we 
cumulate the market-adjusted return for six days beginning on the auction day. We construct a 
weighted av erage separately for buys and sells and for 3 categories of size for the package 
trades, where the weights are the dollar volume of the package trade. The three size groups are: 
small trades, including trades that make up less than 50 percent of that stock' s average daily 
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dollar volume; medium trades, including trades between 50 and 100 percent of average daily 
dollar volume; and large trades, including trades larger than the average dollar volume traded in 
one day. 
Our dollar trading volume variable is based on the difference between trading volume in 
the direction of the package trade versus trading volume against the direction of the package 
trade. For each half-hour period we sum separately the buyer-initiated and seller-initiated dollar 
trading volume associated with each stock in the package. Given the substantial differences in 
trading v olume across stocks in the sample, we normalize the dollar trading volume by dividing 
the buyer and seller-initiated dollar trading volume by the average daily dollar trading volume 
for that stock (measured over the prior twelve months). We then assign a trade direction to the 
volume series associated with each particular trade within the package. Specifically, if a stock is 
to be purchased (sold) within a package, then the buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) volume is 
designated as volume with the package trade and the seller-initiated (buyer-initiated) volume is 
designated as volume against the package trade. For both series, volume with and against the 
package trade, we construct a weighted average (again the weights are the dollar volume of the 
package trade) where stocks are allocated to a category according to the stock's trade size (small, 
medium and large). Finally, we cumulate the difference between the volume with the package 
trade and the volume against the package trade. By cumulating the difference between the 
volume with and the volume against the trade, we have a measure of the net volume in the 
direction of the package trade for each half-hour period over the window. 
Our third variable measures where trade prices are executed relative to the NBBO at the 
time ofthe trade. For each buyer-initiated trade we calculate the ratio of the trade price to the 
existing national best ask quote, while for each seller-initiated trade we calculate the ratio of the 
existing national best bid quote to the trade price. This ratio, which we refer to as our trading 
efficiency variable, prov ides a measure of where the transaction price occurs relative to the 
corresponding NBBO quote. Ratio values less than one denote trade prices within the NBBO 
spread that contain price improvement, while values greater than one denote trade prices outside 
the NBBO spread that contain price concessions. Like the trading v olume variable, we assign a 
trade direction to the buyer and seller-initiated trading efficiency series based on the direction of 
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the associated trade within the package. This results in a trading efficiency measure with the 
trade and a trading efficiency measure against the trade. Similar to the net volume variable, we 
compute a weighted average of the trading efficiency measures separately for the 3 trade size 
categories (small, medium and large). 
Using these data we examine the three hypotheses listed above by investigating the 
extent to which the manager or the bidders leave 'footprints' of their trading activity in the 
period surrounding the auction. The first hypothesis asks whether the cost differential between 
trading the securities as a package and trading the securities individually is due to the bidders' 
ability to cross a portion of the package trades with their own inventory, as opposed to the 
manager trading each individual security using his standard trading technique. Provided the 
bidder is able to cross some of the trades within the package and consequently avoid the market 
altogether, we should observe, on average, a smaller trading impact associated with the stocks in 
the completed packages relative to the passed packages. Moreover, this difference is likely to be 
greatest for the most difficult (largest) trades. Figure 2 compares the cumulative market-adjusted 
return, or price impact, surrounding the auction date for the passed packages (Panel A) and the 
completed packages (Panel B). Other things equal, the larger the percentage of the package ' s 
stocks that are not traded the larger the positive (negative) slope associated with the cumulated 
price impact for buys (sells). Also, the larger the volume to be traded, the steeper the slope 
should be. Consistent with our hypothesis, the cumulative trading impact of the passed packages 
(Panel A) is substantially larger than the trading impact of the completed packages (Panel B) for 
virtually all trade sizes. Moreover, a large fraction of the trading impact appears within two 
trading days of the auction. Also, the larger is the trade, the greater is the price impact both for 
buy and sell trades as well as for passed and completed packages. 
The second hypothesis is that the manager demands more immediacy than the bidders. 
We argue that the patience of the bidders is likely to manifest itself as a long investment horizon, 
since bidders have the ability to spread trades over a longer time. One way to investigate this is 
to analyze the difference between the cumulative trading volume in the direction ofthe package 
trade and the cumulative trading volume against the trade. This difference in cumulative trading 
volume expresses the 'excess ' trading volume that accumulates in the direction that the manager, 
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and potentially the bidders, may be trading. Under the hypothesis that the bidders have a longer 
investment horizon, the bidder's net trading volume in the direction of the trade should be 
positive but less than the manager's net trading volume in the direction of the trade. Figure 3 
compares the net trading volume in the direction of the trade for passed and completed packages 
broken out by trade size over the auction day, the subsequent day, and days 2 through 5 
aggregated together. Notice that in general, the net cumulative volume measures are all positive, 
suggesting that there is more volume cumulating in the direction of the manager's trade than 
against. Consistent with our hypothesis, the net cumulative volume measures for the passed 
package trades are higher than the net cumulative volume measures for the completed packages 
trades, particularly for the small and medium size trades for the two trading days following the 
auction. While there appears to be less of a clear difference between the net cumulative volume 
measures for the large trades, the auction day results are consistent with our intuition. These 
results provide some evidence consistent with the bidders being able to work the trades over a 
longer horizon thereby incurring smaller transaction costs because of low immediacy demands. 
The third hypothesis suggests that bidders are, on average, more facile traders. Despite 
the fact that trading expertise is extremely difficult to quantify given the complexity of the 
notion of a "good" trade and the many ways of measuring performance, we focus on one aspect 
of trading performance, namely the transaction price relative to the quoted bid-ask spread 
(NBBO). On one hand, the ability of a trader to execute trades inside the quoted spread suggests 
an ability to capture price improv ement for his trade and thereby reduce the costs of immediacy. 
On the other hand, transacting at prices that exceed the quoted prices suggests the trader is 
paying a price concession, in addition to the quoted spread, to execute the order immediately or 
to trade in size. Thus, the ability of a trader to routinely trade inside the spread, despite trading 
large quantities, would be consistent with trading expertise. We measure the trading expertise of 
the manager and the bidders by comparing the trading efficiency variable in the direction of the 
package trades. If the manager's trading efficiency ratio is higher than the bidder's trading 
efficiency ratio, it implies that the bidders are more adept at realizing price improvement and/or 
av oiding price concessions for their trades as compared to the manager. 
Figure 4 compares the difference in the trading efficiency measures between passed and 
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completed packages broken out by trade size over the auction day, the subsequent day, and days 
2 through 5 aggregated together. The results show that the trading efficiency measure for the 
completed package trades remains at or below one with few exceptions (one notable exception 
are small trades early the day of the auction). This suggests that the bidders are trading at or 
inside the quoted spread, typically avoiding price concessions when they trade. In contrast, there 
are sustained periods where the trading efficiency measures for the passed package trades are 
above one, most notable of these are the largest trades during the auction day. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, the trades the manager executes himself (passed trades) are more likely to carry 
with them larger transaction costs because he is executing larger trades and suffering price 
concessions. And as expected, it is the largest trades that generate the highest price concessions 
for the manager. 
5. Strategies within the Blind Auction: Bidder Behavior and Manager Decisions 
5.1 Bidder Behavior 
In addition to information on the characteristics of the securities contained in the 
packages, we also have the individual bids (in cents per share) submitted by all competing 
brokers in the auctions for the packages. The number of brokers participating in an individual 
auction ranges from three to six. However, there were four brokers that participated regularly 
throughout the sample period, so the analysis we present below will focus exclusively on those 
four brokers9. 
Table 4 contains summary statistics on package characteristics and broker bidding 
behavior reported separately by broker and by whether the broker's bid was a winning or a 
losing bid. Panel A reports mean characteristics of bids and packages when the broker submitted 
a losing bid in an auction for a package, and Panel B reports the same statistics for packages 
where the broker submitted the winning bid (i.e., the asset manager accepted the low bid) or the 
best bid (the asset manager passed on the low bid) in an auction. Each panel in Table 4 reports 
the 
9The number of bids submitted by the three brokers that we excluded from the analysis ranged from three to seven, 
and none were winning bids. 
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following separately for each broker: the bid, stated both in cents per share and as a percentage 
of the total value of the package; the differences between the broker's bid and (a) the winning (or 
lowest) bid, (b) the second best bid, and (c) the high bid; the difference between the broker's bid 
and the estimated benchmark trade cost, as described in section 4.1; and the mean values of the 
package characteristics described in section 3.2. 
Turning ftrst to Panel B that contains the results associated with the brokers' winning 
bids, a relationship is ev ident between the degree of trading difficulty of a package and the 
broker who submitted a winning bid. For example, broker A tended to submit relatively high 
bids for the least difficult packages - those packages with the smallest total value and that 
contained the largest cap (most liquid) stocks, stocks with trade volumes that represent a small 
percentage of average daily volume, the lowest percentage of Nasdaq stocks, and a low share 
volume for the component stocks. These are packages for which the estimated benchmark 
execution cost (1.43%) is relatively low. Consistent with this profile is a conservative bidding 
strategy in which broker A tended to win by just edging out the others in tight bidding. Broker 
A 's average winning bid is just 6 basis points below the second best bid, and only 65 basis points 
below the estimated benchmark cost of individually executing all the implied transactions in the 
package. 
At the other extreme, broker D submitted the lowest bids for the most difficult packages: 
those packages with the largest total value and that contained the smallest cap (least liquid) 
stocks, stocks with trade volumes that represent a large percentage of average daily volume, the 
highest percentage ofNasdaq stocks, and a high share volume for the component stocks. The 
estimated benchmark execution cost for these packages is 1. 81%. In pursuing these more 
difficult packages, broker D is following a more aggressive bidding strategy in which the 
average winning bid is 20 basis points below the second best bid and a substantial111 basis 
points below the estimated benchmark cost of individually executing all the implied transactions 
in the package. One might interpret this as evidence of the winner's curse, but remember that it 
is quite possible that broker D might have been able to cross many of these transactions with 
existing trades in its book, resulting in a low average cost of disposing of the package contents. 
Although we do not have direct evidence on this, we examine this possibility indirectly in the 
next subsection. 
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Brokers B and C appear to be following moderately aggressive bidding strategies that 
might be described as more balanced than broker D, winning with relatively high bids for 
packages of moderate to difficult trade characteristics. The estimated benchmark execution cost 
for these packages ranges from 1.84% to 2.03%. Brokers B and C submitted bids that are 10 to 
15 basis points below the second best bid and just over 100 basis points below the estimated 
benchmark cost of individually executing all the implied transactions in the package. 
The evidence in Panel A of Table 4 regarding the losing bids tends to reinforce the 
assessment of bidding strategies sketched above. For instance, Broker A's conservative strategy 
is evident in the level of the losing bid relative to both the winning bid and the benchmark cost. 
When broker A loses, his bid is significantly higher, by 30 basis points, than the winning (or 
best) bid, and is 66 basis points below the benchmark cost, virtually the same difference as when 
he submitted the winning bid. At the other extreme, Broker D appears to submit fairly 
aggressive bids even when he loses, the bids being only 18 basis points higher, on average, than 
the winning bid. Interestingly, broker D's losing bids are only 57 basis points lower than the 
benchmark cost for those packages, in direct contrast to the 111 basis point difference for his 
winning bids, further highlighting the aggressive nature of his bidding strategy in auctions that 
he wins. 
5.2 The Determinants of Bidder Behavior 
The above results regarding the relation between bidding strategy and package 
characteristics prompt the question: Do specific package characteristics factor into the bid 
calculation differently across brokers? For example, one broker might attach more importance to 
the presence of extremely large trades in a package than another broker, perhaps because of a 
relatively weaker trade desk. Or one broker might attach more significance to the concentration 
ofNasdaq stocks within a package than to the number of names in a package because they have 
less access to a Nasdaq market making operations and are less concerned that they be able to 
cross the trades internally. To examine these issues, we estimate the empirical model of the 
determinants of package bids that was developed in section 4.2 separately for each of the four 
brokers in our sample10: 
The resulting bidding functions, estimated across both winning and losing bids, are reported in 
Table 5. 
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The regression estimates in Table 5 show that the influence of the package characteristics 
on the magnitude of the submitted bids varies across brokers. The package characteristics that 
appear to have the largest and most significant impact on bid levels are the average of the price 
inverses of the stocks within the package, a proxy for the average bid-ask spread, and total shares 
in the package. The coefficients on price inverse and total shares are positive and significant for 
each of the broker regressions. As discussed earlier, both these characteristics result in higher 
expected trade costs for a package and, therefore, higher bids . Regarding the other 
characteristics, there are some differences across the brokers with respect to the extent they 
condition their bids on these v ariables. For example, Broker A's bids are not significantly 
related to the number of stocks in the package, the presence of excessively large trades in the 
package (as measured by skewness of the distribution of trade size within the package), or to the 
percentage of Nasdaq stocks in the portfolio. Indeed, the skewness coefficient, although 
insignificant, comes in negatively. These results might be evidence of a very simple bidding 
strategy, or evidence that Broker A expects to be able to cross many of the trades with existing 
positions in its portfolio so that the expected costs of executing the trades in the package is not 
relevant. 11 
10 We also estimated the models in this section with two additional variables that were described in section 4.2 -the 
number of buys as a percentage of the total number of trades in the package, and the overnight return on the S&P 
500 futures from Globex. For the same reasons described in that section, the coefficients on the two variables are 
insignificant in each broker-specific model, so we do not report the models that include those variables. 
11 We also estimate a version of the Table 5 regression where, in addition to the original variables, each explanatory 
variable is interacted with a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the bid is a winning (or best) bid and zero 
otherwise. The coefficients on the variables that are interacted with the dummy variable measure the difference in a 
variable's influence on the broker's bidding strategy depending on whether the broker submitted the lowest bid 
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5. 3 TheM anager 's Decision to Accept or Reject the Low Bid 
Another interesting aspect ofthe auction process is the decision by the asset manager to 
either accept the lowest bid, or pass and execute the individual trades himself. In general, the 
cost savings afforded a typical manager through the auction mechanism is the difference between 
the lowest bid and the benchmark cost. This measure of cost savings is positive and significant 
for both completed and passed packages and, interestingly, is larger for the passed packages (see 
Table 3). Reinforcing this result, the realized trade costs of the specific manager within this 
study are also higher than the low bid for 80% of the passed packages. Given these findings , it 
would be useful to better understand the manager's decision process regarding the acceptance of 
bids. 
We investigate the manager' s decision by estimating a probit model of the choice to 
accept or reject the low bid. The dependent variable equals one when the asset manager accepts 
the lowest bid (completed package) and zero otherwise (passed package). The explanatory 
variables reflect the information revealed to the manager v ia the distribution of bids. 
Specifically, we use the low bid, the difference between the low bid and the second lowest bid, 
and the range of the bids (difference between the highest and lowest bid). In addition, we 
include the benchmark cost that we estimated for each package. 
Table 6 presents four models to analyze the manager' s decision. In each model, the 
coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the impact of the variable on the probability of 
accepting the low bid. Modell confirms the standard intuition that the lower (more aggressive) 
the low bid the higher the probability that the manager will accept the bid. Model 2 investigates 
how the difference between the benchmark cost and the low bid influences the choice. The 
coefficient suggests that the more difficult the package (the higher the benchmark cost) the more 
likely the manager will pass on the low bid. This result can be interpreted as the manager 
imposing a reservation bid above which the manager passes, irrespective of the cost of executing 
the indiv idual trades. Model3 incorporates more information about the distribution of the bids. 
We include the lowest bid, the difference between the lowest and second lowest bid as well as 
versus when the broker's bid was not the lowest. The results are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to 
those presented in Table 5, however, few of the coefficients on these additional variables are significant. 
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the range of the bids. As before the lower the winning bid the more likely the manager will 
accept the bid. In addition, the larger the range of the bids, the more likely the manager will 
accept. This result is consistent with a manager choosing to trade a package when the winning 
bid is unusually aggressive relativ e to the other bids (presumably because of some bidder 
specific advantage, like an extensive inventory). Our last model incorporates all four 
explanatory variables as well as dummy variables for each bidder to control for the identity of 
the bidders. None of the bidder dummy variables was significant. Consistent with the previous 
models, the low bid loads negativ ely and the bid range loads positively . In contrast to Model 2, 
the benchmark cost is insignificant. Thus, the manager appears not to condition on the identity 
of the bidders, and after controlling for the low bid and the range of the bids, the level of the 
benchmark cost does not figure into his decision on whether to accept or pass on the package. 12 
6. Conclusion 
The equity market landscape is replete with different trading mechanisms designed to 
provide liquidity to market participants. Given the vast array of trading mechanisms available, 
the question of which one is best is an obvious question with not such an obv ious answer. We 
explore an alternative liquidity provision mechanism whereby a liquidity demander auctions a 
package of trades to potential liquidity suppliers through a blind auction. The auction 
mechanism results in a transaction efficiency gain - our fmdings suggest that auctioning 
packages prov ides an 81 basis point transaction cost savings for liquidity demanders, as well as 
an efficient method for liquidity suppliers to acquire order flow. We present evidence that the 
transaction cost savings are attributable to the liquidity supplier's ability to execute the 
component trades of the package at lower cost than the asset manager because of the liquidity 
supplier' s ( 1) ability to cross portions of the package with his own inventory, (2) longer trading 
horizon, and (3) greater trading expertise. 
Our results have both regulatory and practitioner implications. On the regulatory side, 
the results suggest that the push for a consolidated, one-size-fits-all model ofliquidity provision 
12 We also estimated the probit model with the overnight return on the S&P 500 futures from Globex; however, the 
estimated coefficient was consistently insignificant for all model specifications and therefore not reported. 
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implicitly ignores the disparate needs of liquidity demanders with respect to the execution of 
their trades. Those needs might best be served using different trading venues with different 
mechanisms. Our study of the package auction process demonstrates that an alternative liquidity 
provision mechanism can in fact provide cost savings relative to traditional liquidity provision 
mechanisms. In a larger sense, the findings highlight the importance of being able to innovate 
via new liquidity provision mechanisms that provide trading adv antages not easily duplicated on 
more traditional exchanges. 
From the practitioner perspective, the significant reduction in institutional trading costs 
demonstrated here has important implications for the investment performance of professionally 
managed funds because the large trading costs incurred by institutions are a major contributor to 
the poor performance widely documented in the literature. In addition, a blind auction of 
package trades represents an attractive liquidity provision mechanism for institutional traders 
given a number of recent developments that have added to the overall costs of transacting. First, 
recent reductions in the minimum tick size have resulted in significantly diminished quoted 
depth as well as displayed limit order depth. This change has likely increased transaction costs 
for institutional market participants who trade in large volume (Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)). 
Second, the dispersion of depth across many competing trading venues has increased the search 
cost of finding liquidity providers for individual securities, particular, small-cap stocks. For 
these reasons, the package auction is an attractive alternative. In particular, auction bids are 
unconstrained by minimum tick sizes. Moreover, diminished cumulative depth coupled with its 
fragmentation among competing exchanges makes having liquidity providers come to the 
institution instead of conducting a counterparty search, another advantageous feature. 
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Table 1 
Package Components and Aggregate Statistics for the October 29, 1999 Package 
Panel A contains a list ofthe individual securities that were auctioned as a package on October 29, 1999, 
and reports whether the individual security transaction was a buy or a sell, the desired number of shares to 
be traded, and a relativ e measure of trade size, VolRatio. VolRatio is defmed as [(Number of Shares 
Traded* Price) I (Average Daily Dollar Trade Volume over the previous 12 months)]* 100. Panel B 
presents some of the summary characteristics for the October 29, 1999 package that were provided to the 
bidders for their use in preparing bids for the package. 
Panel A : Package Com~onents 
Ticker Buy/Sell Shares VolRatio 
ADPT s 2700 0.52 
AFG B 72100 126.42 
BSC s 4900 0.94 
CCR s 4800 0.81 
CDD s 27500 15.92 
CI B 19000 2. 87 
CLE s 106700 22.99 
CMI-I s 35250 8.87 
CP B 8900 2.33 
CTX s 20000 5.66 
DLJ s 21600 4.43 
EAT B 9700 3.12 
ENI B 9000 3.78 
ETR B 9800 1.68 
FHS B 26000 3.42 
Panel B: Aggregate ~ackage statistics 
Number of Stocks 
Total Number of Shares 
Average Closing Price 
Total Value of Package ($Mil) 
% of stocks that are Nasdaq 

















Median market capitalization ($bill) of stocks in package 
Mean price inverse for stocks in package (%) 
Mean shares traded per stock 
Mean (Vo!Ratio) for stocks in package(%) 




























































Characteristics of Common Stock Package Trades, Reported Separately for Completed and Passed Packages 
Panel A contains statistics for auctioned packages for which a bid was accepted and the package contents were transferred to the bidder. Panel B 
contains statistics for those packages for which the low bid was rejected and the securities in the package were individually traded by the asset 
manager. Vo!Ratio is defined as [(!\umber of Shares Traded* Price) I (Average Daily Dollar Trade Volume over the previous 12 months)] * 
100. Total value of the packages is $4.27 billion in Panel A and $3.05 billion in Panel B. All packages were auctioned during the period July 
1998 to July 2000 
Mean StdDev Min 25th Median 75th Max 
Panel A: Completed Packages (N=48) 
Total Value of securities in the Package ($Mill) 88 .97 73.33 16.36 39.03 58.08 122.36 323.25 
Number of Stocks in Package 163 101 30 82 129 243 396 
% of stocks that are Nasdaq 23.3 7.6 6.8 19. 1 24.2 28.2 37.4 
% of stocks that are buys 50.8 14.0 15.8 44.1 50.0 53.3 100.0 
Mean shares traded per stock 20651 12910 3289 11743 18526 27890 66655 
Mean (Vo!Ratio) for stocks in Pkg (%) 10.81 6.24 1.00 5.66 10.40 14.36 26.69 
Mean market cap($ Mill) of stocks in Pkg 13358.5 11275.1 1403.2 6086.4 9583.6 13065.2 40442.6 
Mean price inverse of stocks in Pkg (%) 3 79 0 82 2 05 3 27 3 88 430 5 80 
Panel B: Passed Packages (N=35) 
Total Value of securities in the Package ($Mill) 87.26 50.11 26.97 45.82 86.85 114.03 231.31 
Number of Stocks in Package 98 41 38 74 93 11 5 220 
%of stocks that are Nasdaq 26.4 11 .7 4.5 15.7 26.4 33.8 48.6 
% of stocks that are buys 46.7 6.6 31.9 41.6 45.6 51.6 59.6 
Mean shares traded per stock 35743 20076 11444 19052 30170 48571 80992 
Mean (Vo!Ratio) for stocks in Pkg (%) 15.21 9.89 4.18 8.03 12.33 19.63 45.29 
Mean market cap($ Mill) of stocks in Pkg 11534.2 10596.9 1890.4 4513.1 7000.8 14587.3 38330.0 
Mean price inverse of stocks in Pkg (%) 4.06 0.98 2.74 3.00 4.16 4.90 6.29 
Table 3 
Mean Low Bids and Estimated Benchmark Costs for Package Trades 
The table reports average values for the winning (or low) auction bids and for estimates of a benchmark cost of trading 
the securities in the package by a typical institutional trader, and the manager' s realized trading costs. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. The package trades were auctioned during the period July 1998 to July 2000. 
The benchmark cost is a volume-weighted average of the individual cost estimates for all the securities in the package. 
To obtain estimates of trade cost (commissions+ impact) for each of the indiv idual securities in the package, we use the 
following estimation of a model proposed by Keirn and Madhavan (1997): 
Buys: Cost,= -0.2318 + 0.4803D,orc + 0.9563Trsize, + 25.0328Pinv, - 0.0973ln(rncapJ Adj R2=0.052 
(n=35,468) (-3.48) (7.66) (21. 73) (22.45) (-4. 75) 
Sells: Cost,= 0.5803 + 0.5845D,OTc + l.7100Trsize, + 5.3080Pinv, - 0. 1713ln(rncapJ Adj R2=0.053 
(n=32,471) (9.58) (8 .50) (30.21) (6.38) (-8.32) 
where Cost, is one way total trade cost (price impact+ broker commissions) in percent; D,orc equals 1 if traded security i 
is Nasdaq, 0 otherwise; Trsizei equals number of shares traded I shares outstanding, in percent; Pinv, is the inverse of the 
closing price of security i on the day before the trade; and rncap, equals price of security i * shares outstanding, stated in 
billions of dollars. The parameter estimates above are from Keirn (2002). The model is estimated for U.S. equity trades 
for 33 institutions for the period 4/96 to 3/97. These parameter estimates are used in conjunction with the corresponding 
characteristics of the individual components of the package to obtain an estimate of the cost of executing an individual 
trade having those characteristics by a representative institution. 
Estimated Benchmark Trade Cost(%) 
Winning (or Low) Bid(% of total package value) 
Manager's Realized Trade Cost (%) 
Benchmark Cost - Bid 






















Packages t (Passed - Traded) 
(N = 35) 










Bidding by Brokers on Blind Packages 
The table presents summary statistics specific to each broker's losing bids (Panel A) and winning 
bids (Panel B). The top portion of each panel contains average values of each broker' s losing (Panel 
A) and winning (Panel B) bids, reported both in cents per share and as a percentage of total package 
value. Also reported in the top portion of each panel are average values of the corresponding 
winning bids, second-best bids, worst bids, and benchmark costs (as defined in Table III) for the 
auctioned packages, all stated relative to the broker' s bid (in percent). VolRatio is defined as 
[(Number of Shares Traded * Price) I (Average Daily Dollar Trade Volume over the previous 12 
months)]* 100. The results are based on 83 packages auctioned during July 1998 to July 2000. 
Broker 
A B c D 
Panel A : Mean Characteristics of Bids & Packages when Broker Submitted Losing Bid 
Number of Bids 60 43 56 35 
Broker's Losing Bid (cents/share) 31.6 32.1 28 .6 25.2 
Broker's Losing Bid(%) 1.14 1.15 1.02 0.83 
Winning or Best B id (%Y -0.30 -0.27 -0.22 -0.18 
2nd Best Bid (% Y -0.17 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 
Worst Bid (%Y 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.18 
Benchmark Cost (% Y 0.66 0.77 0.77 0.57 
Mean of Total Package Value ($ million) 94.4 93.9 82.8 75.8 
Mean Number of Stocks in Package 139 129 145 145 
Mean Percentage Nasdaq Stocks 24. 1 25.5 23 .9 22. 1 
Mean Percentage of Buys 49.4 47.9 49.8 50.9 
Mean Shares Traded per Stock 28,393 28,606 24,411 20,321 
Mean (VolRatio) (%) 12.74 13.44 11 .75 9.73 
Mean Mkt Cap ($ bill) of stocks in Package 12.5 10.9 13.6 16.1 
Panel B: Characteristics of Bids & Packages when Broker Submitted Winning or Low Bid 
Number of Bids 7 39 25 12 
Broker's Winning or Best Bid (cents/share) 25. 1 22.1 27.5 19.6 
Broker's Winning or Best Bid(%) 0.79 0.83 0.99 0.70 
2nd Best Bid (% i 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.20 
Worst B id (%f 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.50 
Benchmark Cost (% f 0.65 1.02 1.05 1.11 
Mean of Total Package Value($ million) 51.5 81.8 101.4 120.9 
Mean Number of Stocks in Package 76 145 116 200 
Mean Percentage Nasdaq Stocks 22.9 23.9 26.5 23.7 
Mean Percentage of Buys 51.5 50.3 47.8 46.5 
Mean Shares Traded per Stock 22,973 24,872 33,081 23,671 
Mean (VolRatio) (%) 8.15 11 .96 14.32 14.36 
Mean Mkt Cap ($ bill) of stocks in Package 18.8 13.8 10.9 8.4 
1 Bold indicates that the value is significantly different from the broker's losing bid at the .05 level. 
2 Bold indicates that the value is significantly different from the broker's winning bid at the .05level. 
Table 5 
Individual Bidding Functions for Package Auctions 
The table reports estimates of the following model separately for each of the four brokers who bid on the 
packages in our sample 
where: Bid, is the broker's bid for package i stated as a percent of the value of the package and reported 
in percentage terms; NumStocks; is the number of stocks in package i; NumShr; is the mean number of 
shares traded for stocks in package i, in thousands of shares; TrSkew, is the estimated skewness of the 
distribution of VolRatio for stocks in the package i; N asdaq; is the percentage of stocks in package i that 
trade on Nasdaq (in%); and liP; is the mean of the ratio of 1.0 I price for the stocks in package i. 
VolRatio is defined as [(Number of Shares Traded* Price) I (Average Daily Dollar Trade Volume over 
the previous 12 months)]* 100. The results are drawn for a total sample of 83 packages auctioned over 
the period July 1998 to July 2000. T-values are reported in parentheses. Values in bold are significant at 
the 5% level. 
Broker 
A B c D 
Intercept -0.6370 -0.4595 -0.1074 0.0331 
(-3.39) (-2.64) (-0.90) (0.22) 
Number of Stocks in package -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0009 
(-0.88) (-3.52) (-5.05) (-2.82) 
Mean Shares Traded for Stocks in Package 0.0114 0.0108 0.0054 0.0039 
(5.99) (5.94) (4.28) (1.70) 
Trade Size Skewness 0.0174 0.0325 0.0092 0.0099 
(0.63) (1.36) (0.56) (0.47) 
%of Stocks in Package that trade on Nasdaq 0.0058 0.0200 0.0040 0.0127 
(1.36) (4.61) (1 .27) (3.11) 
Price Inverse (proxy for Bid-Ask Spread) 0.3297 0.1899 0.2640 0.1351 
(7.13) (4.11) (7.68) (3.51) 
AdjustedR2 0.66 0.62 0.67 0.48 
Number of Observations 67 82 81 47 
Table 6 
Probit Model of Asset Manager's Decision to Trade or Pass 
This table presents the results of a pro bit analysis of the decision to accept the lowest submitted bid or 
reject all bids. The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if the packages was completed and zero 
otherwise. *Model4 was also estimated using dummy variables for the indiv idual bidders and no 
coefficient was significant at the 5% level. Values in bold are significant at the 1% level. Standard 
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Figure 1. A Comparison of Tr ade Costs to Auction Bids. The Benchmark trade cost estimate is generated 
using the Keirn-Madhavan (1997) trade cost model using data from Keirn (2002). The winning/low package bid 
represents the winning bid in the case of a completed package and the lowest bid in the case of a passed package. 
The realized trade costs are the costs the manager actually incurred trading the components of the passed packages. 
The data in the completed (passed) portions of the graph are listed in chronological order. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Market-adjusted Returns for Passed and Completed Packages. Mmket-adjusted returns 
are constructed by subtracting the daily Russell 2000 value index return from the daily return of each stock in a 
package and then cumulated for six days starting on the auction day. Aggregate statistics are calculated using a 
weighted average of abnormal returns, where the weights are the dollar volume of the package trades. Small, 
medium and large trades represent less than one half, between one half and one, and more than one days worth, 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Net Volume in the Direction of the Package Trades. Dollar volume is summed at 30-
minute intervals and normalized by average daily dollar volume over the past 12 months, signed using Lee and 
Ready (1991) and then cumulated by initiator. Each series represents the weighted average of the difference 
between the cumulative volume in the direction of the packages trade and the cumulative volume against the 
package trade, where the weights are the dollar volume of the package trades. Small, medium and large trades 
represent less than one half, between one half and one, and more than one days worth, respectively, of average daily 
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Figure 4: Trading Efficiency Measure in the Direction ofthe Package Trade. For each trade the ratio of the 
trade price to the quoted ask, in the case of a buyer-initiated trade, or the ratio of the quoted bid to the trade price, in 
the case of a seller-initiated trade is calculated. Weighted averages of these ratios are calculated at 30-rninute 
intervals where the weights are dollar volume of the package trade. The initiator is determined using the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algoritlun. Small, medium and large trades represent less than one half, between one half and one, and 
more than one days worth, respectively, of average daily dollar trading volume. 
